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1. Introduction 
 
Genetic determinism is the idea that significant human characteristics are strongly linked to 
the presence of certain genes; that it is extremely difficult to attempt to modify criminal 
behavior or obesity or alcoholism by any means other than genetic manipulation. Recent 
discussion of human cloning has revealed how real a possibility genetic determinism seems 
to many people. Surveying this discussion, the eminent developmental biologist Lewis 
Wolpert was amused to see so many ‘moralists who denied that genes have an important 
effect on behavior now saying that a cloned individual’s behavior will be entirely 
determined by their genetic make-up’ (Wolpert, 1998). His observation is accurate, and 
the vehemence of many attacks on behavioral genetics probably reflects an underlying 
belief that if genes affect behavior at all, then they must determine it. In fact, genes are 
very unlikely to be deterministic causes of behavior, for reasons I will come to in a 
moment. But if genetic determinism is unlikely to be true, why are we as a community so 
afraid of it? Wolpert seems to think that moral and political commentators on biology are 
simply ignorant, but the facts of which they are supposedly ignorant have been widely 
available for a very long time. Perhaps there is more to the strange persistence of genetic 
determinism. 
 
The psychologist Susan Oyama has famously compared arguing against genetic 
determinism to battling the undead: 
 
“But wait,” the exasperated reader cries, “everyone nowadays knows that development is 
a matter of interaction. You’re beating a dead horse. 
 I reply, “I would like nothing better than to stop beating him, but every time I 
think I am free of him he kicks me and does rude things to the intellectual and political 
environment. He seems to be a phantom horse with a thousand incarnations, and he gets 
more subtle each time around. ... What we need here, to switch metaphors in midstream, is 
the stake-in-the-heart move, and the heart is the notion that some influences are more 
equal than others, that form, or its modern agent, information, exists before the 
interactions in which it appears and must be transmitted to the organism either through the 
genes or by the environment. (Oyama, 1985: 26-7) 
 
Oyama suggests that genetic determinism is inherent in the way we currently represent 
genes and what genes do1. As long as genes are represented as containing information 
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about how the organism will develop, they will continue to be regarded as determining 
causes no matter how much evidence exists to the contrary. The denial that developmental 
information is localized in the genes is the ‘stake in the heart’ that will lay he vampire of 
genetic determinism to rest.  
 
In a recent paper, Philip Kitcher has strongly disputed Oyama’s diagnosis, and Richard 
Lewontin’s related call for a ‘dialectical biology’, arguing that the conventional 
‘interactionist’ perspective on development is the correct framework for understanding the 
role of the genes in development. The persistence of genetic determinism, Kitcher argues, 
is not caused by any conceptual problem in current representations of genetic causation, 
but by two much simpler facts: the universal human preference for simple explanations 
over complex ones and the sheer difficulty of communicating complex science to a wider 
audience (Kitcher, 2001). Kitcher agrees that the widespread acceptance of genetic 
determinism reflects ‘the tendency to draw certain kinds of pictures on the basis of 
woefully inadequate evidence’ (p. 399) and that the resulting misunderstandings of genetic 
causation are likely to have a deleterious effect on public policy decisions (pp. 409-11). He 
understands the motivation that leads Oyama, Lewontin and others to call for a wholly 
new approach to understanding developmental causation: “It is small wonder then, that 
people appalled by the sloppy thinking...yearn for the ‘stake in the heart’ move.” (Kitcher,
2001: 396).  Kitcher fears, however, that calls for a radical new approach may serve to 
entrench genetic determinism rather than helping to displace it. Calls for a radical new 
biology will merely alienate working scie tists from practical efforts to take account of 
non-genetic factors in development: ‘critics of conclusions about the important effects of 
genotype on phenotype will be seen as taking refuge in nebulous appeals for a new general 
view of causation of behavior and as driven to this predicament solely by their sense of 
outrage at the determinist claims’ (Kitcher, 2001: 408) 
 
While acknowledging the legitimacy of many of Kitcher’s observations, I believe that 
Oyama’s diagnosis of the problem is substantially correct. In this paper I try to support her 
view in three main ways. First, I give an account of some examine the fallacious ways of 
thinking about genetic causation that make up genetic determinism and argue that these 
ways of thinking are a natural consequence of attributing semantic properties to the gene. 
Second, I use data from an empirical study of biologists to document an apparent 
association between endorsing informational representations of the gene and being 
relatively uninterested in contextual effects on gene expression. I do not want to place too 
much weight on this one, preliminary result, but it does suggests that efforts to determine 
whether Oyama is correct need not be confined to philosophical argument: the claim that 
genetic determinism is cau ed by a certain representation of the gene can be bolstered by 
documenting a correlation between determinist thinking and that representation. Finally, I 
suggest that Kitcher is mistaken in thinking that “neither Lewontin’s ‘dialectical biology’ 
nor Oyama’s ‘developmental systems theory’ offer anything that aspiring researchers can 
                                                                                                                    
1 Oyama’s influential book The Ontogeny of Information (Oyama, 1985), from which the above quotation 
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put to work” (Kitcher, 2001: 408). There is a substantial research tradition in 
developmental psychobiology that fits the prescriptions of developmental systems theory 
(DST) for the simple reason that DST is an attempt to abstract a theoretical framework 
from research in that tradition. Philosophers of science and other commentators on the 
biological sciences need to become more aware of this tradition and its achievements. 
Popular presentations of those achievements may also offer a practical route to improving 
public understanding of the role of the genes in development. 
 
2. Genetic Determinism and the Informational Gene 
 
2.1. What is genetic determinism?  
 
In contemporary popular discourse, a trait that is supposedly characteristic of one sex, of 
some ethnic group, or of humanity in general is said to be in ‘in the genes’ just as in 
previous centuries such traits were said to be ‘in the blood’. Individual differences that 
might once have been said to ‘run in the family’ are now attributed to genes. The popular 
concept of a genetic trait is the latest expression of the ancient idea that some traits are 
inborn and unalterable expressions of an organism’s nature, whilst others are acquired, 
malleable effects of experience. Opening today’s New York Times I read that human 
cartilage is too weak for the demands of American football and “that's something that is 
genetically predetermined. It's the way God made us” (Roberts, 2002: 23). The scientific 
validity of a sharp distinction between ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’ has long been debated. The 
founders of modern animal behavior studies, particularly Konrad Lorenz, attempted to 
provide a scientific basis for the distinction between nature and nurture with the  
‘deprivation experiment’. Behaviors that develop when the organism is experimentally 
deprived of the opportunity to learn are innate, whilst those that fail to develop are 
acquired. Innate behaviors result from evolutionary adaptation and are transmitted in the 
genes. Acquired behaviors result from learning. It soon became clear, however, that all 
behaviors have both genetic and non-genetic causes. For any behavior there will be some 
genetic modifications that prevent its development and some non-genetic modifications 
that prevent its development. On the one hand, social deprivation of young rhesus 
monkeys will prevent them from displaying their ‘innate’ sexual behaviors as adults 
(Harlow, Dodsworth, & Harlow, 1965). On the other hand, a rat and a bird will emerge 
from an identical program of conditioning having learnt very different behaviors: their 
genetic endowment affects what is ‘acquired’ (Garcia, McGowan, & Green, 1972). Such 
examples formed the empirical core of Daniel Lehrmann’s influential critique of Lorenz’s 
innateness concept (Lehrman, 1953), a critique that was widely accepted. Ethologists 
came to realize that questions about the development of a behavior and questions about its 
evolution should not be conflated (Tinbergen, 1963). Many evolutionary adaptations 
require complex and highly specific inputs from the environment, and not all traits that are 
robust in the face of variations in the developmental environment are evolutionary 
adaptations. Even Konrad Lorenz grudgingly admitted that he had offered an overly 
simplistic ‘understanding of the relations between phylogenetic adaptation and adaptive 
modifications of behaviour.  It was Lehrman's (1953) critique which, by a somewhat 
devious route, brought the full realisation of these relations to me.’ (Lorenz, 1965: 80).  
 
Once it is accepted that all traits develop as a result of the interaction of genetic and non-
genetic factors, genetic determinism becomes a view about how these factors interact. This 
view can be conveniently represented using  ‘norms of reaction’ - graphical 
representations of a phenotypic variable as a function of genotypic and environmental 
variables. The strongest form of genetic determinism claims that norms of reaction show 
no response to the environmental variable. An organism needs  environment for the trait 
to develop, but it doesn’t matter which environment (Figure 1). Kitcher suggests that 
some modern genetic determinists think norms of reaction have this form, but only in 
some limited, but perhaps contextually important, range of environments. Someone might 
claim, for example, that ‘genetic diseases’ develop in any enviro ment except 
environments which contain specific clinical interventions designed to cure the disease. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A norm of reaction vindicating simple genetic determinism. P = phenotypic 
variable; E = environmental variable; G = genotype. 
 
 
A more moderate form of genetic determinism claims that genetic and environmental 
factors interact additively (Figure 2). Genotype makes a constant difference a ross some 
range of environment. A determinist picture of the relationship between genetic factors 
(G) and education (E) in the determination of IQ (P) might look like this.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Pure additive interaction between genotype and environment 
 
 
Perhaps the single most influential contribution to the literature on the interpretation of 
behavioral genetics is Richard Lewontin paper ‘The analysis of variance and the analysis of 
causes’ (Lewontin, 1974). Lewontin pointed out that the empirical evidence suggests that 
actual norms of reaction are likely to be non-additive (Figure 3). In that case, it makes no 
sense to talk of a particular genotype ‘determining’ a particular phenotypic difference. 
Genotype and environment jointlydetermine the outcome in the straightforward sense that 
the effect of each factor on the outcome is a function of the particular value taken by the 
other factor. Nor, as Lewontin further points out, does it make any sense in the context of 
Figure 3 to perform an analysis of variance on trait differences in a population and 
interpret the resulting statistic as indicating the percentage contribution of genes and 
environment to the trait. The very same causal system can produce a pattern of trait 
differences that correlate 100% with the environmental factor (if everyone lives in the 
environment where the lines cross) or correlate strongly with genotype (if everyone lives 
at one extreme of the graph). According to Lewontin and many others, because gene-
environment interactions are typically non- dditive, heritability studies do not yield 
information about the relative importance of genetic and environmental developmental 
factors in the actual causal process that gives rise to a phenotypic trait2.  
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his norm of reaction figures do not include one showing non-add tive interaction. 
 
 
Figure 3. Non-additive interaction between genotype and environment 
 
Non-additive interaction between developmental causes is a critical element of the case for 
Oyama’s ‘developmental systems’ approach. The point at which interaction becomes non-
additive is the point at which it becomes impossible to think of development as the 
determination of a phenotypic ‘resultant’ by a number of causal ‘vectors’. Instead, the 
causal significance of the actual value of each causal variable becomes a function of the 
actual values of other variables, which is as much as to say that the different factors have 
to be understood as part of a single system. A developmental system in Oyama’s sense can 
be thought of as a norm of reaction in which multiple genetic and multiple non-genetic 
variables interact, often non-additively, and in which the role of developmental timing has 
been made explicit withadditional axes, so that the very same cause acting two different 
stages in development can have a different effect (Gray, 1992). There is, however, no 
objection to using traditional norms of reaction figures to represent the interaction of two 
specific developmental causes, with the other relevant causes held constant to allow the 
experimental study of that relationship.  
 
Figures 1 and 2 represent two senses in which a genotype can be said to ‘determine’ a trait 
or a trait difference. For Kitcher, genetic determinism as a general intellectual position is 
simply the claim that m ny norms of variation have ‘determinist’ shapes. If this claim is 
true, then for many scientific purposes the role of the environment in producing traits or 
trait differences can be neglected. Hence, according to Kitcher, genetic determinism arises 
from the widespread and understandable human desire for simple, mono-causal 
explanations. His antidote to genetic determinism is the careful, case-by-case inve tigation 
of how genetic and environmental factors interact to determine phenotypes. Kitcher is 
confident that in many cases, genetic determinism will prove to be false. He sees 
behavioral genetic research as the most scientifically tractable approach to such 
investigations. Specific genetic loci that are shown to correlate with behavioral traits in 
certain environments provide valuable entry points to the complex molecular pathways 
that construct the behavior. Once these pathways are understood, Kitcher is confident that 
the importance of non-ge etic factors will become evident. I discuss in section six some 
other scientific approaches to developmental interactions that I take to be at least equally 
tractable which Kitcher and other commentators seem to have overlooked.  
 
It is hard to disagree with Kitcher that the careful elucidation of specific developmental 
pathways will provide evidence bearing on the issue of genetic determinism. I also share 
his confidence that in many cases the norm of reaction will turn out not to have a 
‘determinist’ shape. But I am less confident that simply publicizing more examples of non-
additive gene-environment interaction will lay the specter of genetic determinism. Unlike 
Kitcher, Oyama sees the persistence of genetic determinism as a puzzling phenomenon 
that requires special explanation. Consider, for example, a footnote to Kitcher’s paper 
containing an anecdote about a leading population geneticist’s irritated response to the 
assertion by a behavioral geneticist that heritability figures reveal something about the role 
of genes in the development of behavioral traits. Heritability measures, Kitcher comments 
are ‘irrelevant’ and the fact that behavior geneticists persist in using them is ‘an 
unfortunate tic from which they cannot free themselves’ (Kitch r, 2001: 413). It is this 
sort of anomaly that sends Oyama in search of a cause. Why do so many intelligent 
scientists appear to ignore facts that are well known to them, such as the likely non-
additive interaction of genotypes and environment? For Oyama, ‘genetic determinism’ 
refers to something deeper than a pattern of interaction between genotype and 
environment that may or may not hold in any particular case. It is an underlying attitude to 
genes and their role in development that makes it hard to assimilate certain facts and easy 
to assimilate - or to assume - others. Genetic determinism is whatever it is that causes 
otherwise sensible people to draw various inappropriate inferences from evidence 
suggesting that genes have a causal role in the development of a trait. Some typical 
inferences include the following:   
 
· the prevalence of the trait in the population can never be reduced below the 
proportion of variance in the trait found to be correlated with genetic factors 
 
· development of the trait will be insensitive to environmental factors in 
development in rough proportion to 'how genetic' the trait is (the proportion of 
variance in the trait in some study population which is due to genetic factors)
 
· a given genetic change will make a constant difference irrespective of the values of 
other developmental variables and, consequently, that the variance accounted for 
by genetic factors in one population can be safely extrapolated to other 
populations 
 
It is these and other, similar inferences that Oyama takes to result from an underlying 
conception of the gene as a source of information about the phenotypic outcomes of 
development. 
 
 
2.2. The informational gene 
 
Although biologists think of genes as key parts of the molecular machinery that assembles 
a protein product, they also think of them as instructions or programs for the production 
of particular phenotypic traits3. In popular science writing this second representation of 
the gene predominates, leading to assertions like the following: 
 
‘An organism's physiology and behaviour are dictated largely by its genes. And those 
genes are merely repositories of information written in a surprisingly similar manner to the 
one that computer scientists have devised for the storage and transmission of other 
information...[biology] is itself an information technology.’ (Econ mist, 1999: 97) 
 
This way of thinking about genes has its roots in Mendelian or transmission genetics - the 
discipline that first postulated genes. In the absence of any molecular understanding of the 
gene a tractable theoretical and experimental framework was constructed in which genes 
were identified by the phenotypic characters with which they correlated in breeding 
experiments. Developmental biology - the investigation of how characters seen in the 
parent are reconstructed in the offspring was put to one side in favor of a black box 
strategy in which genes, identified in the manner described, were treated as if the 
transmission of a chunk of chromosome explained in and of itself the ‘transmission’ of the 
phenotypic character. Making use of metaphors from the new sciences of information 
theory, cybernetics and computing, biologists came to describe genes as containing 
‘blueprints’, ‘programs’ and ‘instructions’ concerning the traits with which they correlate 
in breeding experiments (Kay, 2000; Keller, 1995). The results of the molecular revolution 
in biology have been explained to the general public almost entirely in these terms.  
 
The popular understanding of the nature of the molecular revolution, and the common 
metaphors used by scientists themselves when explaining their work, are in stark contrast 
to the views of many contemporary philosophers of biology. The biologist and philosopher
of science Sahotra Sarkar has noted that, ‘there is no clear, technical notion of 
“information” in molecular biology.  It is little more than a metaphor that masquerades as 
a theoretical concept and ...leads to a misleading picture of possible explanations in 
molecular biology.’ (Sarkar, 1996:187). The leading philosopher of biology Peter 
Godfrey-Smith concludes that, ‘All the genes can code for, if they code for anything, is the 
primary structure (amino acid sequence) of a protein’ (Godfrey-Smith, 1999: 328). The 
point is not that there is no useful way to apply formalisms from the information sciences 
to the study of molecular developmental systems - there are many such ways. The point is 
that the facts of molecular developmental biology do not correspond to the popular idea 
that the genetic code is a language in which the genome contains instructions about 
phenotypes. Kenneth Schaffner has made this point by saying that there are no tiny 
‘traitunculi’ living in the genome (Schaffner, 1998). The slippage from a code for protein 
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structure to a language for specifying phenotypes embodies a systematic confusion about 
the meaning of the term ‘information’. 
 
Concepts of information can be divided into two very broad classes, which Kim Sterelny 
and I have called ‘causal’4 and ‘intentional’ (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999: 101). Causal 
notions include the measure of quantity of information which is at the heart of the 
mathematical theory of communication as well as the measures found in algorithmic 
complexity theory and various notion of information c ntent nspired by these 
mathematical measures of information quantity (Dretske, 1981). The simplest causal 
accounts of the information content of a signal - what the signal is about - define the 
content as whatever the signal is reliably correlated with. Smoke contains information 
about fire because, as the saying goes, ‘where there’s smoke there’s fire’. The weakness of 
this causal account of information content - and of many of its more complex relatives - is 
that it makes information ubiquitous. As John Maynard Smith has noted, “With this 
definition, there is no difficulty in saying that a gene carries information about adult form; 
an individual with the gene for achondroplasia will have short arms and legs. But we can 
equally well say that a baby's environment carries information about growth; if it is 
malnourished, it will be underweight.” (Maynard Smith, 2000: 189)Maynard Smith 
concludes that a definition of information that can be used to capture the traditional idea 
that genes carry information while other developmental causes merely support the 
expression of that information will have to be a definition that includes an element of what 
philosophers refer to as ‘intentionality’.  
 
Intentional information is information in the sense derived from human thought and 
language. The distinctive feature of intentional information is that it can be false (Godfrey-
Smith, 1989). The utterance ‘There are fairies at the bottom of my garden’, and the 
thought that accompanies it, have never occurred in response to the presence of fairies in 
someone’s garden, because fairies do not exist. The correlation between p ople uttering 
this sentence or having this thought and those people having fairies living in their gardens 
is zero. But this has no effect on what the utterance means or on the content of the 
thought. This is quite different from the case of smoke and fire. If the correlation between 
smoke and fire were zero, then smoke would not carry (causal) information about fire. 
The idea that genes have meaning in something like the way that human thought and 
language have meaning is lurking in the background in many discussions of genetic 
information. This can be seen from the way in which cases of gene-environment 
interaction are described. For example, it has been suggested that under starvation 
conditions, human mothers methylate growth- nhancing genes in their children, and thus 
block transcription of those genes. Children with identical genomes and identical nutrition 
will reach one adult height and weight if they have well-nourished mothers and another if 
they have starving mothers. When, as in this case, such a gene-environm t interaction is 
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information channels later as a special case. In the biological contexts we were concerned ith it is 
assumed on all sides that correlations between developmental factors and phenotypes are of interest 
precisely because they provide evidence of an underlying causal network. 
thought to be an adapttion, the environment is said to trigger a 'disjunctive genetic 
program' (Figure 4).  The genes contain the instruction ‘grow fast if your mother was 
adequately nourished, grow slowly if she was starved’ and the environment specifies 
which disjunct is to be obeyed. 
 
 
Figure 4. Norm of reaction corresponding to a ‘disjunctive genetic program’ 
 
 
However, there are innumerable cases where the norm of reaction for a trait resembles 
that in Figure 4, but where people do not talk of disjunctive programs or regad the norm 
of reaction as an expression of conditional information in the genome. These cases are the 
pathological or merely quirky effects that are revealed by abnormal interventions in 
development, either those made by developmental biologists or those made by nature. The 
claim that the Drosophila genome contains the conditional instruction ‘develop a second 
thorax if given an ether shock’ sounds like metaphor mingled with hyperbole, as does the 
claim that the macaque genome encodes the conditional instruction that a mother should 
kill her babies if she is raised in social isolation. If the concept of information in use here 
were a causal concept, then the contrast between these cases and the case of infant growth 
rates would be puzzling, since the causal information in the genome is more or less the 
same thing as the genome’s norm of reaction. If, however, the concept in use is that of 
intentional information, then it is clear why some outcomes are regarded as part of the 
informational content of the genome and others are not. The intentional content of an 
instruction is the behavior it is intended to produce, not the behavior it actually produces. 
No matter how many students ignore the instruction to write a term paper based closely 
on the set texts, the meaning of that instruction remains the same. That is why it is 
legitimate to deduct grades for not following the instruction even when it is predictable 
that most students will ignore it! Likewise, if the human genome contains the intentional 
information specifying a normal human phenotype, then the information content of the 
genome is unaffected by the cases of what Lorenz used to call ‘bad rearing’, even if these 
cases are in the majority. When the ‘wrong’ outcome occurs the phenotype simply 
misrepresents the information in the genes. 
 
In various contexts, I and others have argued that any analysis of intentional information 
that makes it part of the natural world will reveal that if genes contain intentional 
information, so do many other non-ge etic developmental inputs. The molecular biologist 
Robin Knight and I have called this the ‘parity thesis’5. In thi  paper, however, the 
question is not whether the intentional concept of information content is legitimat ly 
restricted to the genes but only whether it is as a matter of fact used when discussing 
genes and not used when discussing other developmental causes. This latter claim is 
relatively uncontroversial. The fact that the intentional concept of information is used in 
this asymmetric way explains why the proposal that all developmental resources contain 
developmental information has been so controversial. As mentioned above, Maynard 
Smith has argued that only an intentional concept of information can capture the intent of 
the many biologists who have used the idea of information to distinguish the role of genes 
in development from the roles of non-genetic causes (Maynard Smith, 2000). I will rest 
my case, therefore, with just one more example of the asymmetric treatment of genetic and 
non-genetic causes. A critical temperature range in the nest plays a role in sex 
determination in crocodiles strikingly similar to that played by the SRY gene on the Y 
chromosome in mammals. Both initiate a biochemical cascade that masculinizes the fetus. 
Both causal factors are brought into existence by a complex system that has evolved to 
ensure that the masculinizing factor is present often enough to generates the correct sex 
ratio. Despite this, people are intuitively reluctant to describe the temperatur using 
locutions that suggest intentional information. Like the SRY gene, the nest temperature 
can ‘cause’, ‘determine’ and even ‘signal’ the fetus to masculinize, but it sounds odd to 
say that the molecular kinetic energy in the nest provides the fetus with information about 
masculinity. It seems natural to say that the SRY gene contains the ‘instruction’ to 
masculinize the fetus, but this would seem forced in the case of nest temperature. One 
might try to justify this asymmetry by arguing that the effect of temperature is strongly 
                                         
5 The term ‘parity’ derives from Oyamas’ call for ‘parity of reasoning’ in dealing with genetic and 
environmental causes (Oyama, 1985). ‘Parity is the idea that genes and other material causes are on a par. 
The ‘strawman’ parody of developmentalism says that all developmental causes are of equal importanc . 
The real developmentalist position is that the empirical differences between the role of DNA and that of 
cytoplasmic gradients or host-imprinting events do not justify the metaphysical distinctions currently built 
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development do not justify assigning DNA the role of information and control while inheri ed membrane 
templates get the role of ‘material support’ for reading DNA.’ (Griffiths & Knight, 1998: 254). See 
also (Griffiths, 2001; Griffiths & Gray, 1997; Sterelny, Dickison, & Smith, 1996).  The obvious candidate 
for a naturalistic account of intentional information is a ‘telosemantic’ account (Mill kan, 1984; Papineau, 
1987). According to teleosemantics, a representational state like a thought or a sentence contains 
information about the state of ffairs that it its function to represent and something’s function is 
determined by asking what it was intended to do or designed to do. Many genetic and non-gen tic factors 
in development have arguably evolved to exert a certain influence on the phenotype. If so, then it is their 
function is to exert that influence and thus, according to teleosemantics, they contain the instruction to 
exert that kind of influence.  Peter Godfrey-Smith has explored the prospects for a teleosemantic account 
of developmental information (Godfrey-Smith, 1999).  
context dependent. It is only in the very precise context of a crocodile fetus that this 
temperature has this effect. The same, however, is true of the SRY gene, whose effects 
can be blocked by mutations affecting receptors for its products or by the environmental 
conditions in the womb whose tragic results create work for gender reassignment units 
around the world (Money, 1993). Both the temperature and the gene act as switches, 
causing certain other genes to b  transcribed. Neither has any connection to a phenotype 
outside of a specific class of developmental systems.  
 
 
2.3. Intentional information and genetic determinism 
 
In the last section I tried to document the asymmetric use of information talk in biology. 
This asymmetry can help to explain the persistence of genetic determinism. The 
predominant vernacular meaning of ‘information’ is intentional information: the truism that 
the internet contains a lot of information means, not that it has a high degree of entropy, 
but that it contains a large number of intentional representations. It is a central feature of 
intentional information that it retains its identity in the face of misrepresentation or, in the 
case of imperative representations, non-compliance. This is what makes it possible for 
intentional representations to be false and for intentional imperatives to be disobeyed. The 
relationship between an intentional imperative and its effect is thus quite different from 
that between a material cause and it effect. If we describe a gene as a switch that initiates 
a cascade of gene transcription leading to, for example, an initial state of the brain which, 
under some range of environmental conditions, produces a behavioral preference for 
homosexual relationships, it is evident that the link between the switch and its final effect 
is a function of the complex causal system in which the switch is embedded. If the context 
is changed, the gene is no longer a switch that controls homosexuality, any more than a 
light switch remains a light switch when it is wired to an exhaust fan.  If, however, we 
describe the same gene as a genetically encoded instruction to be a homosexual, then, 
intuitively, the presence of different genes at other loci, or prenatal environments that do 
not support the cascade of gene expression, or postnatal environments that lead the brain 
to mature differently, all merely cause the organism to misinterpret or disobey the 
instruction contained in the gene. Furthermore, the gene retains its identity s a ‘gay gene’ 
even in an individual to which it has made some other biochemical contribution, and who 
is, phenotypically, a heterosexual. In other words, intentional information is intrinsically 
context insensitive and thus intrinsically unsuited to express the causal link between genes 
and complex phenotypes, because that link is intrinsically context sensitive6. 
 
Representing genes as intentional imperatives that contain a representation of a phenotype 
supports genetic determinism because it allows genes to retain a link to a specific 
phenotype when they are moved from one context to another. A causal intervention that 
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itself can be characterized in terms of a specific molecular product, or, more usually, its absence (Sarkar, 
1998). Thus, for example, muscular dystrophy can be defined as the inability to synthesize a key protein. 
The link between the phenotype and the loss of gene that templates for that protein is context-insensit ve 
because the phenotype more or less is the loss of that template capacity. 
removes the causal pathway between a gene and the phenotype with which it was 
previously associated does not change the ‘meaning’ of the gene, it merely prevents that 
instruction from being obeyed. It does not put the old phenotype on a par with all the 
other phenotypes that form part of that gene’s norm of reaction.  The new phenotype with 
which the gene is associated as a result of th  in ervention is not the new meaning of the 
gene, it is merely a misrepresentation of the information embodied in the gene. Allowing 
genes to retain their imperative link to a particular phenotype across changes in causal 
context creates a background assumption that if the gene were expressed, it would 
produce the phenotype about which it contains information.  The intentional 
representation of the gene also makes it natural to think that environments in which the 
gene does not ‘express’ its meaning are qualit tively different from those in which it does; 
such environments are somehow abnormal, or pathological because they create a 
mismatch between gene and phenotype. In all these related ways, the intentional 
representation of the gene supports the idea that genes have a constant effect across 
context, and hence the idea that genetic and environmental factors interact additively. If 
genes contain intentional information, then changing the environment either facilitates the 
expression of this information or hi ders expression of the same information. This view is 
naturally represented by something like Figure 2 above, rather than Figure 3. For example, 
if genotype G1 in that figure contains the instruction ‘be intelligent’, for example, 
changing the environment merely determines the extent to which this instruction is obeyed. 
It cannot turn G1 into an instruction to be unintelligent, as would seem to happen in 
Figure 3. Thus, intentional representations of genes lead almost inevitably to one of the 
central fall cies identified in Lewontin’s critique of behavioral genetics - the d fault 
assumption that associations between a gene and a phenotypic difference observed in one 
environment can be extrapolated to any other ‘normal’ or ‘healthy’ environment. 
 
The intentional representation of the gene is connected to the other, more vulgar fallacies 
described in section 2.1 by various simple misunderstandings of the sort that Kitcher and 
others have observed to bedevil public understanding of genetics. If the claim that a 
behavior is 30% genetic is understood to mean that in 30% of cases studied the behavior 
can be traced back to the presence of a particular gene, then the intentional representation 
of the gene suggests that these form a ‘hard core’ of cases which will be insensitive to 
environmental variation. These are the 30% in which homosexuality is caused, not by a 
specific developmental environment, but by an instruction to be homosexual that would be 
present in any environment. It is all too easy to imagine the claim tha  schizophrenia or 
same-sex preference is 30% genetic being understood in this way. Alternatively, if a 
continuous trait such as height or obesity is described as being 30% genetic, and if this is 
understood as partitioning the actual trait into a portion that can be ascribed to the genes 
and a portion than can be ascribed to the environment, then the intentional representation 
of the gene will suggest that the part due to the genes can only be suppressed by inducing 
individuals in each generation to misrepresent their genetic nature. 
 
 
3. Can the influence of ‘information talk’ be tested 
empirically?  
 
Oyama claims that representing genes and gene action in terms of information leads to 
certain errors in reasoning. In the last section, I tried to spell out some plausible ways in 
which this could occur. But Oyama’s claim ought also to be capable of empirical testing. If 
she is correct, then there should be an association between using the informational concept 
of the gene, in which genes are type-identifi d by the developmental information they 
contain, and neglect of the role of contextual factors in gene expression. A questionnaire 
study conducted on eighty-one post-PhD Australia biologists by Karola C. Stotz and 
myself in 1999 produced a result that suggests that such an association is worth testing for 
more carefully (Stotz & Griffiths, In preparation). In that study, biologists with training 
and experience in developmental biology were much less likely to endorse the idea that the 
gene can be adequately defined as a unit of information than those with backgrounds in 
biochemistry and pure molecular genetics (Figure 5).  
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Figure 5. Molecular and developmental biologists were offered a list of ‘short definitions’ 
of the gene and asked which they would endorse if forced to choose only one:  
1. That which makes the difference between two phenotypes [gene P] 
2. A nucleic acid sequence with a certain characteristic structure [structure] 
3. A nucleic acid sequence with a certain characteristic function [function] 
4. A carrier of heritable information [information] 
5. A resource for development [geneD] 
[Comments in square brackets are keys to the graph and did not appear on the 
questionnaire.] 
Association 0.553; Significance 0.008.  
 
Other results from the same study are consistent with the equally widely held view that 
developmental biologists view DNA sequences in the light of contextual factors that affect 
the expression and processing of gene products. The responses of developmental 
biologists to questions about whether two DNA sequences are ‘the same gene’ were 
significantly influenced by information about such contextual factors. Molecular biologists 
without experience in developmental biology tended to neglect these contextual factors, in 
the sense that their survey responses were not affected by information about them. Putting 
these two results together suggests that those scientists who are least concerned with 
contextual effects on gene expression are the happiest to endorse the idea that genes are, 
fundamentally, carriers of information. This finding does not, of course, allow us to 
determine whether one of these ideas promotes the other, or whether both ideas are 
expressions of some deeper conceptual commitments, so they do not constitute any very 
strong vindication of my argument in section 2. The results are, however, consistent with 
my theoretically motivated prediction that the informational gene concept should be 
associated with a neglect of contextual factors in gene expression. 
 
4. The research agenda of developmental systems theory 
 
An important part of Kitcher’s critique of Oyama, and of others who argue that the 
persistence of genetic determinism has a deeper explanation, is the observation that, 
“neither Lewontin’s ‘dialectical biology’ nor Oyama’s ‘developmental systems theory’ 
offer anything that aspiring researchers can put to work” (Kitcher, 2001: 408). Hence, 
Oyama and Lewontin are calling for a radical, new approach to genetic causatio  when no 
such approach is available. The result, Kitcher suggests, will be to convince practical 
scientists that whatever the shortcoming of mono-causal genetic explanations, there is no 
practical alternative. In this respect, I suspect, Kitcher has been misled by the heavy 
emphasis amongst philosophers of science on evolutionary biology and evolutionary 
explanations of human behavior. There is a vast philosophical literature on this topic, some 
of the best of it by Kitcher himself (Kitcher, 1985), and in the evolutionary context, 
Kitcher’s complaint has real substance. Russell Gray and I have described the sort of 
evolutionary research that might be facilitated by a developmental systems perspective 
(Gray, 2001; Griffiths & Gray, 2001) and recent work on the evolutionary significance of 
epigenetic inheritance and niche-construction can be regarded as a partial vindication of 
these claims (Avital & Jablonka, 2001; Jablonka & Lamb, 1995; Laland, Odling-Smee, & 
Feldman, 2001; Odling-Smee, Laland, & Feldman, 1996). However, the case for the 
practical relevance of developmental systems theory is much easier to make in the 
developmental context. Until recently, philosophers of science have paid very little 
attention to developmental biology, and still less to the developmental biology of 
behavioral traits. But there is a rich experimental tradition in developmental psychobiology 
dating back several decades and developmental systems theory is to a large extent an
attempt to make explicit and reflect on the core concepts of this research tradition. 
Developmental psychobiology might perhaps be defined as the experimental elucidation of 
the effects of genetic and environmental factors and their interactions in the ontogeny of 
gross behavioral traits. This sort of research was pioneered work in the inter-war years by 
American comparative psychologists and continued after WWII in the work of their 
students and of developmentally-oriented workers in the new science of ethology, 
especially those influenced by Daniel Lehrman (Gottlieb, 2001; Johnston, 2001). 
Developmental psychobiology differs from behavioral genetics in its methodological 
emphasis on experimental intervention in the laboratory, as opposed to the descriptive-
statistical study of natural populations, a feature that places it closer to developmental 
biology. A textbook presentation of this kind of work can be found in George Michel and 
Celia Moore’s excellent Developmental Psychobiology : An interdisciplinary science 
(Michel & Moore, 1995). When I talk above of the importance of interactions between 
genes and environment, I am referring not so much to the statistical interactions revealed 
by behavioral genetics at the population level, but to the causal interactions as revealed by 
experiments in developmental psychobiology. The call to pay more attention to 
developmental interactions is not merely an appeal to complexity. Instead, it is an appeal 
to move beyond using genes as statistical markers for phenotypes and to understand them 
as biochemical causes of development. As an imperative to researchers, this can mean 
something very practical and not at all unappealing, like ‘going molecular’ and 
investigating the causes of, for example, mental illness at the level of functional genomics, 
proteomics and developmental neurobiology (Schaffner, 2001). 
 
5. Developmental psychobiology and the public understanding 
of genetics 
 
I suggest that it will be difficult to impr ve popular understanding of genetics while 
continuing to rely on what has so far been the main conceptual tool of popularization - the 
idea that genes are blueprints or programs. As I have argued, this formulation makes a 
deterministic reading of claims about the role of genes in development almost inevitable. 
This poses a considerable problem. ‘Information talk’ in molecular biology is not going to 
disappear in the foreseeable future. There really is a genetic code, there are numerous 
legitimate applications of technical notions of information in molecular biology and the 
informal, quasi-cybernetic notions of ‘signaling’, ‘switching’ and ‘feedback’ are the patois 
of molecular developmental biology. Unfortunately, the mathematical meaning of 
‘information’ is too unintuitive and too far from the usual meaning of the word to become 
part of popular consciousness and even terms like ‘signaling’ irresistibly suggest that what 
is being signaled is an intentional message. Hence, neither eschewing information talk not 
explaining it properly to a wide audience seems to be practicable.  
 
The only practical solution to improving the public understanding of what genes do, I 
suggest, is the popularization of another kind of biological research that can act as a 
counterweight to popular misinterpretations of information talk. That counterweight ought 
to be developmental biology and developmental psychobiology. Both disciplines have the 
advantage that they can discuss gross phenotypic characters that are easily and intuitiv ly 
grasped by a popular science audience - th  carapace of the turtle, or the mutual 
recognition of parent and offspring in ducks. They explain these characters using causal, 
rather than informational, locutions and by recounting experimental interventions that 
often involve macro-level physical processes that are also relatively easy to grasp. Genes 
often figure in these developmental narratives as things activated by other factors, and 
those other factors are often environmental. Explanations of development in this idiom 
thus automatically correct the impression that genes are God-lik  ‘p ime movers 
themselves unmoved’. Developmental psychobiological explanations also have a strong 
tendency to focus on gene-environment interactions, so they also automatically stress 
context dependence.  Fortunately, popular writing about this kind of science has started to 
appear in recent years (Bateson, 1999; Gottlieb, 1997). David S. Moore’s The Dependent 
Gene is a particularly successful example of this genre (Moore, 2001). It can only be 
hoped that some stock examples from this tradition will become firmly entrenched in the 
popular imagination as a counterweight to the dim awareness that ‘scientists have 
discovered’ genes for this, genes for that and the genes for the other.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Oyama and others have argued that that genetic determinism - the view that genetic causes 
have strong, context-insensitive connections to their phenotypic effects - is kept in 
existence in the face of contrary evidence by the idea that genes contain information about 
phenotypes or instructions for development. Kitcher has disputed this diagnosis, arguing 
that the strange persistence of genetic determinism is due to the human preference for 
simple explanations and the difficulty of communicating complex scientific results to a 
wider audience. I have offered both theoretical and empirical arguments in favor of 
Oyama’s explanation. At a theoretical level, I have argued that the predominant vernacular 
conception of information is intentional information and that the concept of intentional 
information is precisely that of a message whose content is unchanged by contextual 
effects on the way the message is interpreted. Thus, thinking of genes as containing 
intentional, imperative messages inevitably leads to the view they the link between genes 
and phenotypes will be unaffected by changes in other developmental factors. At an 
empirical level, I have presented a preliminary finding of a statistical association between 
the informational conception of the gene and a neglect of contextual effects on gene 
expression, a finding at least consistent with the theoretical picture I have outlined.  
 
Kitcher has also suggested that Oyama’s call for a radical new approach to development 
will be counterproductive because no practical research program exists which will allow 
scientists to head that call. This is an important and legitimate concern, but I have argued 
that Kitcher has overlooked the empirical work in developmental psychobiology that 
inspires the theoretical work of Oyama and others. Developmental psychobiology is a 
practical alternative - or supplement - to the kind of work in behavioral genetics that 
Oyama and Kitcher agree is frequently and illegitimately used to support genetic 
determinism. Finally, I have suggested that the best way to improve the public 
understanding of genetics is to present popular accounts of experimental findings in 
developmental psychobiology, and experimental developmental biology ore generally, to 
counteract the effects of simplistic presentations of statistical associations between genes 
and phenotypes. 
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